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Popular software for high assurance systems is not readily available.  
Developers do not want to develop or port applications for secure systems 
because of the perception that high assurance development is too time 
consuming, in some cases impossible, and that performance is inadequate. This 
trend must be stopped by showing that if an intelligent approach to porting 
software is used, then the development costs will be acceptable. 
The network file system (NFS) service, which is a rather complex module 
that provides widely used functionality for file sharing, has been ported to the 
XTS-400 to show that a port can be completed in a timely manner and to assess 
the challenges of development for a multilevel system. Porting starts by 
analyzing the major requirements of the software and of the target system, and 
then proceeds to developing an approach for tackling the port. 
The hardest part of porting is the learning curve required to understand 
the target system and the software to be ported.  Once this is accomplished, then 
porting becomes straightforward.  Tests demonstrated that remote clients were 
able to access shared files on the NFS server.  The XTS-400 now has the 
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Developing software for a multilevel secure (MLS) system, contrary to the 
general belief that it is difficult, is, in fact, rather manageable.  Beginning with an 
analysis and following up by selecting the right approach makes porting software 
to high assurance systems quite cost effective.  Developing NFS for the XTS-400 
will be used as a case study for experimenting with a porting methodology. 
Definitions will be provided for MLS systems, the XTS-400, and the NFS 
protocol.  A methodology for porting will be presented and explanations will be 
given for the necessary tools and common pitfalls encountered when porting 
software.  
The results of the porting experience are summarized and lessons are 
gleaned from these results.  In addition, suggestions for better possible 
approaches are presented.  Also, future extensions to this project are outlined.  
This experiment concludes that the hardest part of the port is the initial learning 
curve required to understand the target system and software to be ported.  The 




























I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MOTIVATION/PURPOSE  
In today's computer environment, criminal activity is becoming more 
commonplace because computers are both vulnerable and pervasive.  Important 
activities are done on computers now, and sensitive information that needs 
protection is being processed through computers.  So there is a dire need for 
secure computer systems.  But users are hesitant about the future of secure 
systems.  Users like to have their favorite software packages available.  
Customers are accustomed to certain software and will not use a system if it is 
not available.  It seems that developing popular software for existing secure 
systems would solve this problem, but software developers are not doing so 
because they assume that developing for secure computers is too costly. 
It will be shown that valuable software with complicated requirements can 
be successfully ported to a secure system.  This experiment can be used as an 
example to show effective practices and pitfalls in the porting process.  With such 
an example, perhaps the assumption that developing for secure systems is cost 
prohibitive will be dispelled, and it will pave a path for other important software to 
be ported.  The value of secure systems will be explained along with the unique 
challenges for developing software for them.  The ported software in this case 
study will be the network file system (NFS) service that is popularly used among 
commodity hardware for file sharing. 
B. MLS: MULTILEVEL SECURITY 
Multilevel security (MLS) is an important concept that needs to be widely 
deployed.  MLS provides for files to be classified at different confidentiality and 
integrity levels and to only allow access to a file if the user has sufficient 
authorization.  Common levels of classification are Unclassified, Classified, 
Secret, and Top Secret.  A more in-depth definition of multilevel security controls 
is [SCHELL74]:  
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those controls needed to process several levels of classified 
material from unclassified through compartmented top secret in a 
multi-process multi-user computer system with simultaneous 
access to the system by users with differing levels of clearances.   
MLS is required in many areas, such as the government sector, that processes 
data related to national security and for the business sector where information 
must be protected to ensure privacy.  In the digital world, components that must 
enforce MLS policies include operating systems, file systems, and databases. 
Without an MLS system, a user would require three different computers to 
process information at three different classification levels.  This would be quite 
unwieldy.  It would be much more convenient if all this different information could 
be available on the same machine.  Also having information on separate 
computers is extremely inefficient and requires more equipment than necessary.  
This separate computer model is burdensome in a facility that requires 
information sharing.  In 1972, the Computer Security Panel estimated that 
separate systems require the additional cost of $100 million per year for the Air 
Force [SCHELL74].  But if all the information at different levels is on the same 
computer, great care must be taken to ensure that information is not 
inadvertently leaked to  another classification level.   
The main objective of an MLS system is the enforcement of a mandatory 
access control policy.  This is based on Bell and LaPadula's (BLP) formal 
security model [BELL73].  BLP is used to model the policy in such a way that it 
can be analysed.  Also, the mathematical formulation allows it to be mapped to a 
technical implementation.  The simple security property of this model prohibits 
“data at a higher level from being read by a process at a lower level" [PERRINE]. 
The other rule, the star (*) property, "prohibits a process at a higher level from 
writing to a lower level data" [PERRINE]. 
Related to the concept of MLS, a Security Kernel is normally mentioned to 
make sure that MLS is properly enforced.  The kernel enforces the security policy 
and constrains the operating system layer.  The Security Kernel is small and only 
provides very basic functions.  It must be small so that it can be verified; 
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verification ensures that the security policy is properly enforced.  Then an 
operating system layer, which provides functionality but does not need to be 
secure because it does not enforce policy, can be built on top of the small kernel.  
This was done for several systems such as KSOS [PERRINE], GEMSOS [GEM], 
and STOP [MANU].  The Security Kernel is a necessary ingredient for high 
assurance systems. 
Some systems that have implemented MLS policies.  The Kernelized 
Secure Operating System (KSOS) is one such system.  KSOS has three levels of 
security [PERRINE].  The security kernel of KSOS was designed and modeled 
after a finite-state machine and system calls are defined in terms of state 
transitions [PERRINE].  The security kernel is verified by defining an initial known 
secure state and then checking to see that all possible state transitions (system 
calls) led to a secure state [PERRINE].  KSOS has only 32 kernel calls and thus 
is manageable.  KSOS was used by the Navy and Air Force to provide "multi-
level secure application gateways on very secure DoD networks" [PERRINE].   
The problem with this system and other high assurance systems, is that little 
software is available for them. 
C. MYSEA: MONTEREY SECURITY ENCHANCED ARCHITECTURE 
The Monterey Security Enhanced Architecture (MYSEA) project goal is to 
provide a high assurance architecture that "supports mandatory enforcement of 
confidentiality and integrity policies in hostile environments" [IRV04]. It achieves 
this by using commodity products that are readily available and affordable.  The 
other advantage of MYSEA’s use of commodity products is that users are 
already familiar with these products, which leads to a higher likelihood of 
acceptance for high assurance systems.   
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Figure 1.   Monterey Security Enhanced Architecture, From [IRV04] 
 
At the heart of MYSEA is the XTS-400, which acts as a secure server for 
hosting applications.  The XTS-400 was chosen for its high assurance 
capabilities.  Properties of the XTS-400 that make it a good fit for the MYSEA 
project include: high assurance multilevel platform, remote trusted path, Linux 
binary compatibles, and correct security policy enforcement [IRV04].  These 
factors also make the XTS-400 a good candidate for use as a target system for a 
port.   
The untrusted clients in the MYSEA architecture require a file system to 
function properly, but the file system must be on the MLS server, the locus of the 
security policy enforcement.  So the untrusted clients need to use a remote, 
bootable  file  system  that  comes  from  a  trusted  server.   NFS  provides  this  
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capability.  By creating an NFS port for this system, the MYSEA project will be 
even more attractive and this will help to ensure its success as a trailblazer for 
useful secure systems.   
D. SUMMARY 
MLS systems are needed for the secure processing of sensitive 
information [TP85].  This overview of MLS shows what is needed and what is 
different for developing these types of systems.  There has been some prior work 
on secure systems, but it was not successful due to a lack of important software.  
Chapter II provides information on NFS, the target system XTS-400, and why 
porting software to different hardware/software platforms is difficult.  Chapter III 
shows how to approach the port, what type of environment the XTS-400 provides 
for the program and the necessary tools for porting.  Chapter IV illustrates how to 
test the port to see if it is successful.  Chapter V describes the lessons learned 
from implementing the port and reflects on how the NFS port could have been 

















A. STOP: SECURE TRUSTED OPERATING PROGRAM  
1. Overview 
The XTS-400, which runs on Intel-based hardware, is the successor to the 
XTS-300.  The XTS-300 is one of a few systems that was evaluated at the Class 
B3 level.  Under the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria, systems 
evaluated at Class B3 level provides a high level of assurance of correct policy 
enforcement and functionality [TP85].  Requirements for Class B3 systems 
include [WANG99]:  
enforcement of mandatory and discretionary access control polices, 
a trusted path to ensure a reliable TCB-to-user communication 
connection, and an alarm mechanism to detect the accumulation of 
events that indicate an imminent violation of the security policy.   
The trusted computing base (TCB) of a system is the set of hardware, firmware, 
and software that is responsible for the enforcement of a security policy [TP85].  
The TCB needs to enforce the principle of least privilege, which only gives users 
the necessary functionality to perform their task [SALT75].  The TCB also needs 
to adhere to a modular, abstract, and data-hiding design to reduce complexity. 
STOP is the operating system for the XTS-400 system.  STOP, which is a 
multilevel secure operating system, provides virtual memory, multiprocessing, 
and "uses hardware protection level mechanism in conjunction with software 
mechanism for protection" [WANG99].  The formal security model implemented 
by STOP is the Bell and LaPadula model [BELL73].  This model outlines a 
confidentiality policy for both mandatory and discretionary access control.  The 
mandatory component of the Bell and LaPadula model states that users can read 
information at their current level and lower; the users can write information at 
their current level and higher.  The integrity model used by STOP is the Biba 
model [BIBA].  The Biba model specifies that users can only read data that is of 
equal or higher integrity than their level and can only write data at their current 
level and lower. 
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2. Ring Architecture 
A ring architecture divides a system into layers so that the most privileged 
operations are protected in the innermost layer and the least privileged 
operations are performed in the outer layers.  The outer layers depend on the 
inner layer for trusted functionality, and in order for a request from the outermost 
layer to reach the innermost layer, that request must be cascaded through all the 
intermediate layers.  Due to the clear distinction between layers and the 
simplicity of this model, the ring architecture is found in several operating 
systems that have security as a design objective. This was first implemented in 
Multics [MULT] and later in GEMSOS [GEM].  STOP uses four rings. 
 
Figure 2.   XTS-400 Ring Architecture, From [WANG99] 
 
   Here the rings of the XTS-400 are described [WANG99].  The most 
trusted layer, Ring 0, is the Security Kernel. This layer provides basic operating 
system services and enforces system security.  These services include resource 
management, process scheduling, interrupt and trap handling, auditing and the 
enforcement of a mandatory security policy, such as a set of rules for enforcing 
system security and system integrity policies [MANU].   
Ring 1 contains the Target Of Evaluation security functions (TSF) System 
Services, which provide Ring 2 with general trusted services, such as a 
hierarchical file system, user I/O, and discretionary access control [MANU].  
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Ring 2 contains the Operating System Services.  This layer provides an 
environment on the XTS to support the execution of Linux-based application 
programs [MANU].  It also provides trusted operating services to both trusted and 
untrusted application software.  
 Untrusted Application Software and Trusted Software are located in Ring 
3.  Trusted Software includes additional security services outside the Security 
Kernel.  The untrusted software is constrained by the security policy of the TSF. 
B. NFS: THE NETWORK FILE SYSTEM PROTOCOL 
1.  Need 
In today's information-based world, the ability to share data is crucial.  
Researchers in different departments must collaborate on projects, and important 
business documents must be edited and reviewed by partners in remote 
locations.  Computer networks have made these capabilities a reality, but a slew 
of supporting software is also needed.  A necessary element to make file -sharing 
efficient is a file system that can be accessed remotely.  An early method of file-
sharing required users to access a central machine remotely where the shared 
files were located.  Unfortunately, these central machines became a bottleneck 
because the numerous requests by clients overloaded the system.  This problem 
spurred a demand for an efficient method to share files across machines. 
2. Requirements for a Remote Distributed File System 
For a remote file system to be considered adequate, it should meet some 
basic requirements.  An important requirement for a remote distributed file 
system is support for a wide array of platforms and operating systems.  This 
means that users are not limited to using only certain systems.  The ability to 
share files among heterogeneous systems is very useful; thus, the network can 
consist of a combination of different systems, and users are still able to share 
files. So it is necessary to take steps during the design process to keep 
interoperability in mind.   
Secondly, access transparency is important so that existing programs do 
not need modification to work properly with the remote file system [COUL]; this 
helps to allow easy adaptation of remote file system services.  Failure 
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transparency is also a good attribute to have since in a network environment 
there are multiple sources where failure can occur.   
Scalability is another important need so that the design can support an 
environment that requires files to be shared among a large user base.  Related to 
scalability, is the requirement for a shared database of necessary information, 
such as usernames, passwords, and available file systems, that can be easily 
updated and accessed.  Where and how this database is maintained needs 
careful consideration.  Lastly, the use of a remote file system should not have 
noticeable performance issues (i.e. it should not take longer than four seconds to 
get a response from the server). 
3. Design 
A simple file system model was created to solve the file-sharing problem.  
This model entailed servers exporting their file systems to a group of clients, and 
the clients importing these remote file systems and presenting them to the user 
as a local file system. 
 
 
Figure 3.   The Division of NFS between Client and Server, From [MCKU] 
 
One of the remote file system protocols that is based on this model is the 
Network File System (NFS) created by Sun Microsystems [MCKU].  With this 
model, NFS provides the capability to share file systems over a network of 
computers.  A distinct feature of the NFS design is its high level abstractions, 
which makes it interoperable with many different local file systems. 
NFS is specified in Request for Comments (RFC) 1094 [SPEC89].  An 
RFC is a standard protocol that has been finalized by the Internet community.  As 
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a public specification, NFS enjoys the benefits of being a standard and has 
implementations on a variety of machines.  Another factor that has helped NFS 
gain wide support is its reliance on RPC, which is available on a wide base of 
systems. 
The NFS service is comprised of three main components: the Remote 
Procedure Call (RPC) portmapper, the mount daemon, and the NFS daemon.  
The portmapper is responsible for registering RPC services and provides 
program lookup information.  Mappings between a port number and a program 
are handled by the portmapper.  When an RPC daemon starts up, it tells the 
portmapper which port it is using and the services (service name and version 
number) it will be handling.  A client wishing to access an RPC service will first 
contact the portmapper to find out which port to use. 
The mount daemon is responsible for the initial request for a remote 
directory share.  Its other duties include validating the client’s credentials and 
checking for proper access permissions.  A successful reply from the mount 
daemon will include a file descriptor, a handle that the client will use in future 
requests for operations on that file [MCKU].  Lastly, there is the NFS daemon, 
which handles the basic remote file operations such as read and write.  
 
Figure 4.   Daemon interaction when a remote file system is mounted, From [MCKU] 
 
  NFS is made to be high level and modular, so that it does not have strict 
requirements on the lower layer.  This allows NFS to run above a variety of 
different file systems, and the underlying file system may be changed to meet 
different operational requirements.   
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NFS attempts to be as stateless as possible; servers do not need to store 
client-state information to function properly.  This stateless design has 
advantages in failure recovery.  For a stateless server, if the server crashed and 
was brought up again, the client would just need to resend its request.  On the 
other hand, a stateful-server crash means that the client must rebuild the server 
state to know if the server received the client’s last request.  Only then will the 
client know if it has to resend its request. 
4. Details 
NFS relies on the Remote Procedure Call (RPC) model [SPEC89].  The 
RPC protocol provides a procedural interface to services, allowing a client to 
request a server's operation through a procedure call.  The RPC model views a 
server program, such as NFS, as a set of procedures.  The combination of host 
address, program number, and procedure number uniquely identifies one remote 
procedure. 
NFS provides UNIX semantics for its procedures, so viewing it from a 
UNIX perspective is helpful.  Most of the UNIX commands for files are supported.  
Access control follows the UNIX model, but the actual permission check is done 
at the lower file system layer and can therefore be implementation dependent. 
NFS is a stateless protocol, but the objects that NFS is required to handle, 
files and directories, are stateful objects.  To handle these objects properly, NFS 
needs to operate in such a way that the attributes of the objects stay consistent.  
NFS does this by requiring all of its important procedures to be idempotent, 
which means "an operation can be performed repeatedly with the same effect as 
if it had been performed exactly once” [COUL]. 
NFS can run over TCP, which provides a robust, connection-oriented 
transport service, or UDP, which provides a minimal datagram delivery service.  
Running NFS over TCP gives more reliability to NFS but affects performance by 
requiring the establishment and maintenance of connections.  Since NFS is 
designed to safely recover from failure, the smaller footprint and faster service 
provided by UDP is sufficient. 
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Since UDP does not guarantee reliable packet transmission, mechanisms 
are needed on the layer above it (the RPC level) to provide more reliable packet 
transmission.  The UDP version does this by sending a datagram and setting a 
timeout value based on the expected time for a reply.  When the timeout expires, 
the datagram is retransmitted.   
However, this retransmission can cause problems with the nonidempotent 
RPC operations because they are unnecessarily repeated.  To help resolve this 
problem, an understanding of round-trip timeout (RTT) is needed.  A larger value 
for the RTT will help avoid the retransmission problem because it allows more 
time for slow reply packets to reach their destination before an unnecessary 
retransmission is triggered. 
On the client side of NFS, the issue of dealing with failures must be 
addressed.  There are two approaches for dealing with this problem.  There is 
the hard mount method in which the client will continue sending its requests to 
the server forever.  The second way is the soft mount method, in which after a 
set timeout period, the procedures will return with a transient error.  The problem 
with the second method is that transient errors are not expected from the file 
system since they are usually considered to be local [SPEC89].  So applications 
not expecting transient errors can incorrectly interpret them as a critical failure 
and exit early.  Another issue concerns how long the timeout values should be.  
Setting it too short can return false positive errors, and setting it long can cause 
the application to hang unnecessarily long when serious connectivity problems 
occur.  A middle ground option is to have an interruptible mount.  This method 
acts as a hard mount, but it can also receive signals [SPEC89].  On the arrival of 
a signal, the blocked system call will return with a transient error.  This allows 
interactive programs that are waiting on an NFS procedure to return to be 
aborted.   
NFS meets most of the requirements for a remote file system, but it has 
shortcomings in certain areas.  NFS was originally designed to have each server 
support around 5 to 10 clients, so its scalability is limited [COUL].  NFS also does 
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not have a distributed system to share its database of users and passwords; 
each client and server needs its configuration files to be individually changed.   
C. THE PORTING PROBLEM 
Porting software from one system to another can be difficult.  The porter 
must look for elements in the software that are dependent on the architectural 
features of the hardware.  The reasons these software pieces exist can range 
from bad programming practices (not developing with portability in mind) to the 
programming language lacking support for expressing an aim in a portable 
fashion [PEMB].  In some cases, finding and fixing these trouble spots is quite 
trivial, but for a code section that implements complicated operations or may 
have a complex chain of dependencies on other code modules, the porter can be 
faced with quite a quandary when trying to figure out how to port it. 
Data types cause numerous porting problems.  This can be seen in the 
range of data types: the maximum and minimum values a type can take on.  
Whether a data type is signed or not will affect this range.  The range problem 
can be seen if an int is expected to be 32-bits on the source system, but on the 
destination system int has only 16-bits; the program's calculations can 
unexpectedly overflow and lead to unreliable results.    
Floating point data types present more complicated problems, stemming 
from its properties and how it is represented on the machine.  According to 
Pemberton [PEMB], floating point numbers are represented as a "fraction f of 
some fixed number digits, in some base b (usually 2, but 16 is not unknown) and 
an exponent e, so that a given number is represented as f x be".  The following 
must be taken into consideration for floating point numbers: the base used, the 
accuracy available, the maximum and minimum values, and epsilon [PEMB].  
Epsilon is the smallest value that can be added to 1.0 to give a different value 
and is usually dependent on the rounding mode used by the arithmetic [PEMB].  
This is important when comparisons are made between floating point values and 
if there is a requirement regarding the level of precision used. 
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Other data type issues include how conversion between different types 
takes place and the properties of pointers. Some systems allow certain sorts of 
pointer arithmetic that are not supported on other systems.  These problems 
usually result in dereferencing null pointers or pointers pointing to strange 
locations. 
At the lower level, details about how data is stored can affect porting.  For 
byte ordering, there is the possibility of little -endian or big-endian.  Systems can 
have different definitions for the length of a word.  For example, a word could be 
represented by either two or four bytes.  Data alignment is another architecture 
dependent attribute.  Programming tricks that rely on how variable size is 
affected by data alignment will break on systems that align differently than what 
was assumed for the original system. 
 If assembly language, which is not easily portable by nature, is used in 
the program, its port could entail a painful one-to-one instruction conversion to 
the target system.  Problems involved in the assembly language porting process 
include different semantics for instructions, such as byte swapping, and no 
equivalent instruction on the target system.  In the case of porting a Complex 
Instruction Set Computer (CISC) based assembly program to a Reduced 
Instruction Set Computer (RISC) system, not only is there lots of dissimilarity 
between the instruction sets, but also an entirely different paradigm of 
programming is required.  The assembly language world is rich with 
programming tricks.  These tricks are applied at the bit level and make 
assumptions about how overflow is handled, how flags are set, and how bits are 
shifted.  All of these can lead to disastrous results on a system that does not 
support them or implements them differently, if porting is done by rote.  Instead a 
careful analysis of the intended program semantics is required.  When this is 
completed, it is often less costly to rewrite the software from scratch rather than 
to try to port it. 
Assembly language is tightly coupled with the processor of a system.  
With the processor in view, a whole slew of factors become apparent.  This 
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includes how pipelining affects the program flow, what sort of branch prediction is 
used, and quirks that are unique to the processor.   There are also hardware-
timing issues based on granularity of a time quantum for different processors. 
Although programming languages are standardized, their implementation 
can vary.  For instance, for the Windows environment for Visual C++ 6.0, defining 
a counter variable for a for loop gives that variable scope outside of the for loop.  
On the other hand, for the UNIX environment for the GCC compiler, the counter 
variable only has local scope inside the for loop.  Compiler optimizations can also 
cause a program to behave differently.  Programs can be reliant on compiler-
specific features that are only available on a specific system.  A development 
environment might also have taken up namespace that is needed by the program 
and thus causes a conflict.  Lastly, how the compiler stores data in memory, how 
it affects the memory stack, and whether it grows the memory stack up or down 
needs to be known in order to port programs. 
As can be seen, many issues can factor into the porting process.  Each 
program has its own unique challenges that must be understood and cannot just 
be automated to have an equivalent in a new system.   Having to understand and 
deal with all these possible roadblocks leads one to the conclusion that porting is 
indeed a challenging problem. 
D. NFS PORTING PROBLEM 
NFS is a multi-component software application.  Because of the inter-
dependency of its subcomponents, NFS is harder to port than  single component 
software.  The different layers cannot necessarily be tested thoroughly 
individually.  A method will need to be devised that can test the components 
together as a whole, as well as allow periodic checks to gauge that each 
component requirement is being met.  Besides being multi-component, NFS is 
also heavily dependent on the local file system mechanics and the system calls 
behavior.  The dependencies of NFS are shown in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5.   NFS dependency chart, From [SAN85] 
 
Another obstacle for porting NFS is that it does not have MLS capabilities 
built into it.  In fact, it cannot even distinguish between different user-ids unless it 
is used in combination with the yptools[SAN85].  A decision will need to be made 
on how to remedy this problem. 
In order for NFS to be considered complete, it must support the following 
operations[SAN85]: 
Filesystem Operations: 
mount(varies) System call to mount filesystem 
mount_root() Mount filesystem as root 
VFS Operations: 
unmount(vfs) Unmount filesystem 
root(vfs) returns (vnode) Return the vnode of the filesystem root 
statfs(vfs) returns (fsstatbuf) Return filesystem statitics 
Vnode Operations: 
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open(vnode, flags) Mark a file open 
close(vnode, flags) Mark a file closed 
rdwr(vnode, uio, rwflag, flags) Read or write a file 
ioctl(vnode, cmd, data, rwflag) Do I/O control operation 
select(vnode, rwflags)  Do select 
getattr(vnode) returns (attr) Return file attributes 
settattr(vnode, attr) Set file attributes 
access(vnode, mode) Check access premission 
lookup(dvnode, name) returns (vnode) Lookup file name in a directory 
create(dvnode, name, attr, excl, mode) returns (vnode) Create a file 
remove(dvnode, name) Remove a file name from a directory 
link(vnode, todvnode, toname) Link to a file 
rename(dvnode, name, todvnode, toname) Rename a file 
mkdir(dvnode, name, attr) returns (dvnode) Create a directory 
rmdir(dvnode, name) Remove a directory 
readdir(dvnode) return (entries) Read directory entries 
symlink(dvnode, name, attr, to_name) Create a symbolic link 
readlink(vp) returns (data) Read the value of a symbolic link 
fsync(vnode) Flush dirty blocks of a file 
inactive(vnode) Mark vnode inactive and do cleanup 
bmap(vnode, blk) returns(devnode, mappedblk) Map a block number 
strategy(bp) Read and write filesystem blocks 
bread(vnode, blockno) returns(buf) Read a block 





III. PROPOSED NFS DESIGN IMPLEMENTATION 
A. PORTING APPROACH 
There are many possible porting approaches, each with unique  
advantages and disadvantages.  Depending on the type of application being 
ported and the type of environment available for development, one approach will 
prove to be more effective than the others.  This section will outline three 
common approaches to porting software.   
The first approach is to modify the existing libraries.  This is done at a 
rather low level and is required when the application relies on the existing 
libraries, but the libraries behave in a manner different from what is expected by 
the software.  The ported application, in this case, is very modular in design and 
does not have system-specific dependency at its own code level.  Depending on 
how these modified libraries are placed in the system, other existing applications 
might fail to run because they require the original libraries.  Fortunately, there are 
ways to specify that the ported application will use the new, modified libraries, 
which existing applications will not use.  This is via declarations of path 
environment variables.  If this is the case, then two copies of the libraries will be 
on the system, thus this method consumes extra hard drive space.  Library files 
can total up to 80 MB, so depending on a system’s hard drive capacity this can 
be an issue.  Since the application code is not modified, this method enjoys the 
advantage of not needing any changes when a newer version of the software is 
needed.  A newer version of the application can be moved onto the target 
system, and the modified libraries are already in place for its use.  
The second approach, which is a variation of the first method, is to create 
a new library that provides the functionalities that are lacking in the existing 
libraries but are needed by the ported application.  The link order becomes an 
important concern for this method because the new library needs to be linked 
ahead of the default libraries to remove incompatibilities, so that the application 
can compile successfully.  This method enjoys many of the benefits of the first 
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approach and has the added advantage of not requiring management of a 
separate, redundant library specifically for the port.  This approach, however, 
needs the application to be recompiled with the correct link order.  The porter 
must have a thorough understanding of how the system loads binaries and how 
the system interacts with libraries in order to use this approach. 
The third approach is to modify the application.  This is required when the 
ported application uses a capability that is not available on the target system.  An 
example of this is that it is possible to select on sockets in UNIX systems, but this 
this function is not available on Windows systems. The advantage to this method 
is that the libraries do not need to be changed.  The disadvantage of this method 
is that with each new version of the application, these same changes will need to 
be reapplied. 
Depending on the application being ported, it is possible that a 
combination of all three approaches will be needed.  For instance, a porter can 
modify an existing library to handle a system call correctly, add required functions 
that were not available in the existing libraries to a new library, and change 
sections of the ported software that used a programming paradigm that is not 
available on the target system.  On the other hand, when any method will work 
for an implementation, a decision must be made regarding which method to use 
so that consistency in the program will be maintained. 
The first method was chosen for the NFS port because it is believed to be 
the quickest method to get the application ported.  This decision was made from 
a quick analysis of the NFS source code.  The conclusion from the analysis is 
that the NFS-relevant code was quite modular and would be able to work without 
any changes, but there were dependency problems on library functions, which 
behaved differently on the XTS system.  These library functions would need to be 
changed.  Since only existing library functions needed modification, and figuring 
out the linking environment of the XTS system so that method two could be used 
would be more time consuming, the first approach was chosen for the NFS port. 
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B. STOP PROGRAMMING ENVIRONMENT 
The XTS-400 target system is missing important porting tools such as 
gdb.  Due to the restrictive nature of this XTS-400 system, it was more efficient to 
develop on a more flexible development system that was made to be a cross-
platform development environment for the XTS-400 system.  Luckily the XTS-400 
Linux environment is based on the standard Redhat 8.0 distribution [RED], so the 
same development tools and libraries can be installed effortlessly on an easier to 
use system.  With its more sophisticated development tools, this system can be 
used to test porting concepts and to compile binaries quickly.  These can then be 
used on the target machine.   
The most glaring difference between the XTS-400 Linux environment and 
that of Redhat is that it uses a 2.2.x kernel rather than the default 2.4.x kernel 
that comes with Redhat 8.0.  This means that differences between these two 
kernels must be taken into account.  Of course, XTS-specific applications and 
services are not available, but the NFS software is specifically designed to avoid 
being dependent on them.  
The XTS-400 does not provide all UNIX functionality, and it also interprets 
some conventions differently.  These differences are what the porting effort must 
address.  For example, there is no UID 0 in the XTS-400.  Because of this, the 
following system calls are affected [MANU]:  chmod, chown , execl, excel, exclp, 
execve, exevp, kill, link, mknod, setgid, setuid, msgctl, semctl, shmctl. 
The real-user-id and real-group-id of a process cannot be modified by 
Linux system calls.  The set-user-id and set-group-id cannot be changed by 
Linux system calls, thus chmod and exec are affected [MANU].  Due to a 
different handling of date access time (st_atime), the following commands are 
affected [MANU]: fstat and stat.  Mandatory file/record locking is not supported, 




At the lower system call level, the following Linux system calls are not 
available [MANU]: 
 acct, adjtimex, bdflush, capget, capset, chroot, clone, 
create_module, delete_module, fstat, fstatfs, get_kernel_syms, idle, 
init_module, ioperm, iopl, lstat, mlock, mlockall, modify_ldt, mount, 
munlook, munlock, munlookall, nfsservctl, old_readdir, old_select, 
oldstat, oldumount, olduname, prctl, pread, pwrite, query_module, 
quotactl, reboot, sched_get_priority_max, sched_getpriority_min, 
sched_getparam, sched_getscheduler, sched_rr_get_interval, 
sched_setparam, sched_setscheduler, sched_yield, sendfile, 
setdomainname, setgroups, sethostname, settimeofday, stime, 
swapoff, swapon, sync, sysctl, sysfs, sysinfo, syslog, umount, 
uselib, ustat, vhangup, vm86, vm86old.  
 
C. DEVELOPMENT TOOLS 
Porting is a complicated process and requires familiarity with a handbag of 
tools for success.  This section will go over the necessary tools that a porter will 
need along with some hints on how use them properly for porting. 
gdb, a debugger for the C programming language, is a crucial tool in the 
porting process.  It can be used to get a quick idea of how a program works and 
the sequence of functions called by the program.  To do this, the porter needs to 
make breakpoints at the necessary location in the code.  Printing values for 
variables and arguments and finding out how function pointers resolve is a 
powerful debugging technique that is indispensable for porting.  However, gdb 
does run into problems for certain programming styles.  For instance, if there is a 
function within an if statement, a step command will not properly go into that 
function.  One can unravel the if statement into multiple statements in order for 
the step command to work, but this unraveling needs to be done very carefully.  
The semantics of original statements should be fully understood before 
attempting unraveling. 
make, a compiling management tool, and gcc, a C language compiler, are 
mandatory development tools.  Using make and gcc can reveal many errors at 
compile time caused by source code change.  In order to use gdb, the source 
needs to be compiled with debugging flags.  The other advantage of make is that 
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it only compiles the files that are affected by any of the changes that were made.  
This saves a lot of time in the edit-compile-debug cycle.  
The X-Windows system of the XTS-400 is a great productivity enhancer.  
The default console only allows one process to run in the foreground at a time.  
However, in the X-Windows environment, running multiple xterm terminals with 
each xterm acting as a separate console is possible.  This enables multiple 
processes to run in their own virtual terminals, which allows multiple server 
programs to run at the same time in their own foreground terminal.  Thus, the 
porter will be able to see all errors message generated by the different server 
programs simultaneously.  
strace, a tool that tracks the system calls made by a program, is an 
invaluable tool in the porting process used to track down where a program is 
crashing.  First, the program is run to see if there are any errors.  If this is the 
case, then a quick run of strace can possibly show where the problem is in the 
form of what functions failed and what the function arguments are.  It is very 
likely that strace will scroll the terminal too fast.  To remedy this problem, the 
script command can be used to capture the output session into a file. 
Source code analysis is essential to the success and timeliness of porting 
software.  But the regular format that source is in is not the most conducive for 
analysis purposes.  To help in this area, a tool will be used that turns a source 
code tree into cross referencing HTML pages that can be read through a web 
browser.  This tool is called global.  The weakness of this tool is that it did not 
provide the source code line number in its display, which is a very handy feature 
that can be used when a program is executing in gdb to find its equivalent place 
in the source code.  lxr is a cross referencing formatting tool that does display 
line numbers, but its weakness is that its display is not as appealing as the one 
provided by global. 
The source code for STOP was also very useful in the porting process.  
When a system call is used and returns an error, the system source code can be 
quickly checked to see if it has been implemented properly.  Although 
24 
documentation can and should take care of this listing of functionality, it is 
sometimes not as thorough as it should be.  For instance, the incorrect handling 
of ioctl with the argument SOCGIFFLAGS is not documented.  Having the 
system source code available will mitigate the problem of deficiency in 
documentation. 
One of the oldest programming tricks for debugging and the first one that 
a programmer learns is to output important values to the screen through the use 
of the printf function.  This technique is very useful. When the porter is stuck, it 
will not hurt to start using printf to output values in various places in the code to 







IV. TESTING THE NFS DESIGN 
Testing was divided into two stages: component testing and integration 
testing.  The component testing phase was to see if the basic functionality 
worked, while the integration testing phase is more thorough and demanding to 
see if the port is complete.  Each will be described in the following sections. 
A. COMPONENT TESTING 
The server is comprised of three components: portmapper, mountd 
daemon, and nfsd daemon. 
This stage of testing involves testing each of the server components 
separately to see if they individually work.  Each test can first be executed locally, 
and then with a remote client issuing the test commands. 
To test the portmapper, a user program is used to connect to the 
portmapper and to make requests to the portmapper to see if the portmapper is 
functioning properly.  This test program is called "rpcinfo".  A successful result 
from "rpcinfo" will show that the portmapper has registered itself as an available 
RPC service.   
To test the mountd daemon, a user program will be used to contact the 
mountd daemon and check it to see if a mount request will return with a valid 
result.  This program is called "mount".  The "rpcinfo" command will also be used 
to see if mountd has properly registered itself with the portmapper.  Also netstat 
can be used at this time to see if the mountd specific ports are open and that the 
related network connections are established. 
To test the nfsd daemon, a user will test to see if he can read and write 
files.  Testing of directory creation and deletion will also be conducted. Users can 
use the commands such as "ls", "touch", "mkdir", and "vi" to do this.  These 
commands will use as arguments the name of files and directories exported by 
an nfsd daemon.  Success is indicated by the successful completion of those 
commands.  The "rpcinfo" command will also be used to see if nfsd has properly 
registered itself with the portmapper. 
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Table 1.   Portmapper Test Results 
Test Description Result 
"rpcinfo" properly connects with portmapper yes 
show that mountd is registered  yes 
show that nfsd is registered yes 
 
 
Table 2.   Mountd Test Results 
Test Description Result 
"rpcinfo" shows that mountd is registered yes 
"mount" command returns sucessfully yes 
"netstat" shows that proper network connection has been made yes 
 
 
Table 3.   Nfsd Test Results 
Test Description Results 
"rpcinfo" shows that nfsd is registered yes 
listing the content of a mounted directory yes 
open and read a file yes 
 
 
B. INTEGRATION TESTING 
The final stage of testing is conducted to determine if clients can mount 
the NFS directories remotely rather than locally.  This testing is more thorough to 
show that a complete implementation of NFS has been provided.  Clients will 
attempt to modify the files on the server, and a check will be made to see if other 
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clients can see the changes made.  The tests include: adding a file, deleting a 
file, removing a directory, adding a directory, and changing the contents of a file.  
There will also be tests to see if the security measures of the implementation 
work: have a client with no access mount a directory, have a client with read-only 
access write files, and have a client mount directory A when only directory B is 
available.    
 
Table 4.   Integration Testing 
Test Description Result 
Redhat 8.0 client can mount yes 
Slackware 7.0 client can mount yes 
create a directory yes 
delete directory yes 
read a file yes 
write a file yes 
create a file yes 
delete a file yes 
mount from a client not allowed in the configuration file no 
Access a file below user level yes 
Access a file at user level yes 
Access a file above user level no 
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V. LESSONS LEARNED 
A. LESSONS LEARNED 
This section will describe some of the problems that were encountered 
during the process of porting the NFS server.   
An issue that increased the complexity for understanding how the program 
works is the interaction between forked processes that run in the background, 
logging facilities, and the permission set for log files.  These type of actions must 
be turned off so that the core functionality of the program can be focused on.  
Fortunately, portmap is made so that its daemon mode can be turned off by 
running it with the '-d' argument.  The mountd process also comes with an option 
that allows it to be run in the foreground. To activate this mode, run the mountd 
binary with the '-F' flag.  Another advantage of running a process in the 
foreground is that it is conducive to debugging.  This is because daemon 
processes usually follow the model of forking and then exiting, and when exit is 
called, the debugging session ends. 
There was the problem of ioctl not working with sockets and the argument 
SIOCGIFCONF.  ioctl is a generic function that is used to set and get device 
information.  A look through the STOP source code shows that it is not 
implemented for sockets.  A way to get around having to use ioctl is to manually 
provide the information that it would return.  One possible solution is to have a 
stub function in place of the function that calls ioctl to just set the sockaddr_in 
argument to the local interface and then return it.  This is an inelegant way of 
fixing this problem, but it works and is effective.  This method was possible 
because the intended use of this function is understood.  A more appropriate 
method would be to actually implement the ioctl to work with these arguments.   
A further study of the XTS-400 development environment shows that the 
SIOCGIFCONF was actually defined, although not usable, through the header 
file "xts/devices/socket.h".  This is explained in the man pages of ioctl_list.  The 
SOCGIFFLAGS argument to ioctl  
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also does not work with sockets.  The purpose of this command is to retrieve the 
flags that are set for a socket.  Returned information includes whether the 
interface is currently up or down. 
B. METHODOLOGY OF PORTING 
There are many lessons that can be gleaned from the experience of 
attempting this port.  Looking back at the process of porting NFS to the XTS-400 
with the advantage of hindsight, it becomes evident that a better approach could 
have been taken.  This section serves as an outline of the steps that were done 
that were good, along with other approaches that would have made the porting 
approach easier. 
First, a general understanding of the ported program is needed.  Reading 
the general information on the topic can facilitate this.  In this case, reading the 
relevant RFC [SPEC89] and some general OS books [MCKU] that have a section 
on NFS would be helpful.  Some online sites with general information are also 
useful.   
Next, an intimate knowledge of how to use the software should be 
acquired.  So a configuration needs to be set up so NFS can be tested. The user 
should note the kind of results to expect and the operations that can be 
performed with the software. 
For porting, it is very important to have a good understanding of the UNIX 
operating system.  For example, one should learn the layout of the file system 
and where to find information.  Also, an advanced, thorough understanding of the 
development process is vital, namely, knowing how the kernel and libraries 
interact with the linker and compiler. 
After the configuration testing, a broad, quick perusal of the source is good 
for getting a general feel of its layout.  At this point, be aware of programming 
constructs that can cause problems on the target system and make note of them.  
At this stage, if familiarity with the target system does not exist, then experiments 
should be conducted on that system to test its capabilities and to get a feel for 
what it can do. 
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One method to gain a better understanding of the source code is to add 
meaningful comments to code sections where they are lacking or absent.  
Another good way to understand the source code is to change a small section of 
it and to see how this affects the program.  The portmapper by default runs on 
port 113, a port number in the privileged range that requires additional 
permissions.  To minimize potential quirks necessary to gain privilege and also to 
help gain familiarity with the portmapper code, the porter can change the 
portmapper's default port to a number higher than 1024 (the unprivileged port 
range).   
Next, the source code can be run through gdb to get a feel for how the 
program runs.  If gdb is not available, then strace must do. If errors are 
encountered on the target machine, try to emulate them on the development 
machine, and stop them at the point of failure.   
Another major concern in the porting process was that a lot of security 
checks are made that do not have a bearing in the target environment.  The 
security can also inhibit understanding the functional part of the ported code.  So 
these checks should be disabled to get the functional part of the port working, 
then they should be reapplied for the port to become complete. Since a good 
understanding of the port has now been obtained, it will be easier to understand 
which of the application level security checks are applicable for the target 
system. 
When the port is divided into separate distinct components that rely on 
each other, a case could arise when one component is completely ported and 
another is attempted, and that could reveal problems in the first component that 
need to be addressed.  So there is a cycle of returning to the first component, 
making changes to it, then testing it, then testing it with the second component to 
see if the first component has met it needs.  For example, to test portmapper, a 
test harness with essentially all of the functionality of mountd and nfsd is needed.  
Therefore instead of creating new test software, these modules were used to test 
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portmapper.  However to know if these modules work correctly, portmapper must 
work correctly.  Thus, all components need to be tested together. 
The bulk of the porting effort deals with unimplemented function calls.  To 
more speedily handle this task, a program should be made that scans the 
servers for all functions and system calls that are used.  This list of required 
functions can then be compared to what is supported on the target system to see 
what needs to be changed or created. 
C. ADDITIONAL WORK 
While a working implementation of NFS was successfully made, it does 
not provide the capability for a user to change his security access level.  Instead, 
it uses the simpler authentication method provided by the NFS protocol, which 
only has host level granularity.  NFS only runs at a single level with the privileges 
of the user executing it. 
A way of approaching an implementation that includes MLS functionality is 
to add another lower level layer component that will be responsible for 
authentication.  This component must be able to handle security labels in a 
manner consistent with the XTS-400.  Also, the format of the configuration file, 
“/etc/exports”, will need to be extended to support security labels.   
This port was accomplished by removing from the ported code all system 
calls that were not available.  A cleaner way of dealing with this is to implement 
these missing system calls.  To do this, instructions for compiling the operating 
system component are needed, which entails a thorough understanding of the 
relevant STOP code.   
Another future task is to implement NFS inside the Linux kernel layer of 
the XTS-400.  A good starting point for a kernel implementation is to look into the 
Linux kernel code for the kernel entry point for NFS, which is sys_nfsservctl 
(system call number 169), for an impression of how NFS calls are dealt with.  
Then a design can be developed based on an analysis of the Linux kernel NFS 
server, with the requirement that it adheres to MLS constraints of the underlining 
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XTS-400 kernel.  An advantage of a kernel implementation is better performance 
because there will be fewer context switches from system mode into user mode. 
NFS was not built with security in mind.  Thus, all of the NFS shared file's 
data is sent in clear text.  NFS should be run in a safe environment where there 
is physical security to the network cabling wires.  To amend the problem of 



















It has been shown that porting is an arduous problem, but steps can be 
taken to make it tractable.  One of the most difficult parts of porting is the learning 
curve necessary to understand the system and the source code of the ported 
software.  Hindsight proves to be a valuable tool to show which methods were 
more effective and how this port could have been better approached.  In 
conclusion, the effort necessary to get an important network service to work on 
an MLS system was manageable, and there should be further attempts to get 
other popular software onto the XTS-400. 
  This project has provided a modified library that has implemented some 
of the missing RPC-related functions for the XTS-400.  Additionally, the 
portmapper can also be used with any other RPC-based server. So, components 
have been developed that can be reused in the future to quicken the porting 
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APPENDIX A: SOURCE CODE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This section will introduce some of the important source code changes 
that were made to make the port work.  It contains the diff file along with 
explanation for why it was changed in the comment sections of the code.  The ‘-‘ 
lines means that it has been added.  The ‘!’ lines means the section of code that 
is different between the original and new source file. 
B. GLIBC DIFF FILES 
 
*** pmap_clnt.c Sun Mar 28 21:20:44 2004 
--- /usr/src/redhat/SOURCES/glib/glibc-2.2.93/sunrpc/pmap_clnt.c Thu 
Aug  8 08:28:03 2002 
*************** 
*** 41,114 **** 
  #include <sys/ioctl.h> 
  #include <sys/socket.h> 
  #include <netinet/in.h> 
  #include <arpa/inet.h> 
  #include <rpc/rpc.h> 
- //#include "bar/pmap_prot.h" 
  #include <rpc/pmap_prot.h> 
  #include <rpc/pmap_clnt.h> 
- #include <string.h> 
   
  /* 
   * Same as get_myaddress, but we try to use the loopback 
   * interface. portmap caches interfaces, and on DHCP clients, 
   * it could be that only loopback is started at this time. 








- static bool_t 
- __kandy_get_myaddress ( struct sockaddr_in *addr) 
- { 
-   int s; 
-   char buf[BUFSIZ]; 
-   struct ifconf ifc; 
-   struct ifreq ifreq, *ifr; 
-   int len, loopback = 1; 
-  
-   printf("kdebug: in kandy_get_myaddress\n"); 
-  
-   /* 
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-  
-   print out the port number that will be used to connect to the 
-   portmapper. 
-  
-   */ 








-   Set the port number of the portmapper we will be connecting to, 
-   need to be in network form 
-   so for port 111, use the following: 28416 
-  
-   for port 1111, use the following: 22276 
-  
- */ 
- // addr->sin_port = 28416; 
-  
-    addr->sin_port = 28416; 
-  
-   /* 
-  
-    Set the IP address to 127.0.0.1 
-  
-   */ 
-    addr->sin_addr.s_addr = 16777343; 
-    memcpy(addr->sin_zero,"\0\0\0\0\0\0\0", 7);  
-  
-  return TRUE; 
- } 
-  
  static bool_t 
  __get_myaddress (struct sockaddr_in *addr) 
  { 
    int s; 
    char buf[BUFSIZ]; 
--- 41,58 ---- 
*************** 
*** 173,195 **** 
    int socket = -1; 
    CLIENT *client; 
    struct pmap parms; 
    bool_t rslt; 
   
!   /* 
!  
!   Call the stub function instead 
!  
!   */ 
!   if (!__kandy_get_myaddress (&myaddress)) 
      return FALSE; 
-  
- //  comment out the improperly implemented function 
39 
-  
- //  if (!__get_myaddress (&myaddress)) 
- //    return FALSE; 
-  
    client = INTUSE(clntudp_bufcreate) (&myaddress, PMAPPROG, PMAPVERS, 
            timeout, &socket, RPCSMALLMSGSIZE, 
            RPCSMALLMSGSIZE); 
    if (client == (CLIENT *) NULL) 
      return (FALSE); 
--- 117,128 ---- 
    int socket = -1; 
    CLIENT *client; 
    struct pmap parms; 
    bool_t rslt; 
   
!   if (!__get_myaddress (&myaddress)) 
      return FALSE; 
    client = INTUSE(clntudp_bufcreate) (&myaddress, PMAPPROG, PMAPVERS, 
            timeout, &socket, RPCSMALLMSGSIZE, 
            RPCSMALLMSGSIZE); 
    if (client == (CLIENT *) NULL) 
      return (FALSE); 
*************** 
*** 221,243 **** 
    int socket = -1; 
    CLIENT *client; 
    struct pmap parms; 
    bool_t rslt; 
   
!   /* 
!  
!   This function is called in pmap_unset, 
!   which is one of the function called to communicate 
!   with the portmapper. 
!  
!   */ 
!   if (!__kandy_get_myaddress (&myaddress)) 
!  return FALSE;  
!  
! //  if (!__get_myaddress (&myaddress)) 
! //    return FALSE; 
!  
    client = INTUSE(clntudp_bufcreate) (&myaddress, PMAPPROG, PMAPVERS, 
            timeout, &socket, RPCSMALLMSGSIZE, 
            RPCSMALLMSGSIZE); 
    if (client == (CLIENT *) NULL) 
      return FALSE; 
--- 154,165 ---- 
    int socket = -1; 
    CLIENT *client; 
    struct pmap parms; 
    bool_t rslt; 
   
!   if (!__get_myaddress (&myaddress)) 
!     return FALSE; 
    client = INTUSE(clntudp_bufcreate) (&myaddress, PMAPPROG, PMAPVERS, 
            timeout, &socket, RPCSMALLMSGSIZE, 
40 
            RPCSMALLMSGSIZE); 
    if (client == (CLIENT *) NULL) 
      return FALSE; 
 
 
*** clnt_udp.c 2004-03-22 07:27:23.000000000 -0800 
--- /usr/src/redhat/SOURCES/glib/glibc-2.2.93/sunrpc/clnt_udp.c 2002-
08-08 01:39:50.000000000 -0700 
*************** 
*** 191,230 **** 
     goto fooy; 
   } 
        /* attempt to bind to prov port */ 
        (void) bindresvport (*sockp, (struct sockaddr_in *) 0); 
        /* the sockets rpc controls are non-blocking */ 
-  
-  /* 
-  
-  This is to test to see if FIOBIO is implemented 
-  with ioctl. 
-  
-  */ 
-  printf("before ioctl FIOBIO\n"); 
-  
        (void) __ioctl (*sockp, FIONBIO, (char *) &dontblock); 
-  
-  printf("after ioctl FIOBIO\n"); 
-  
-  
  #ifdef IP_RECVERR 
        { 
   int on = 1; 
-  
-  /* 
-  
-  This is to test to see if SOL_IP is implemented 
-  for setsockopt. 
-  
-  */ 
-  printf("before setsockopt SOL_IP, IP_RECVERR\n"); 
-  
   __setsockopt (*sockp, SOL_IP, IP_RECVERR, &on, sizeof(on)); 
-  
-  printf("after setsockopt SOL_IP, IP_RECVERR\n"); 
-  
        } 
  #endif 
        cu->cu_closeit = TRUE; 
      } 
    else 
--- 191,205 ---- 
 
 
*** svc.c 2004-03-22 07:59:40.000000000 -0800 




*** 379,396 **** 
  svc_getreq_poll (struct pollfd *pfdp, int pollretval) 
  { 
    register int i; 
    register int fds_found; 
   
-   /* 
-   
-   svc_getreq_poll is used to the querty the RPC subsystem 
-   to see if any messages have arrived. 
-  
-   */ 
-   printf("kdebug: in svc_getreq_poll\n"); 
-  
    for (i = fds_found = 0; i < svc_max_pollfd && fds_found < 
pollretval; ++i) 
      { 
        register struct pollfd *p = &pfdp[i]; 
   
        if (p->fd != -1 && p->revents) 
--- 379,388 ---- 
*************** 
*** 402,418 **** 
       xprt_unregister (xports[p->fd]); 
     else 
       INTUSE(svc_getreq_common) (p->fd); 
   } 
      } 
-     
-    /* 
-  
-    svc_getreq_poll is finished processing the message. 
-  
-    */ 
-    printf("kdebug: done svc_getreq_poll\n"); 
  } 
  INTDEF (svc_getreq_poll) 
   
   
  void 
--- 394,403 ---- 
*************** 
*** 423,439 **** 
    register SVCXPRT *xprt; 
    char cred_area[2 * MAX_AUTH_BYTES + RQCRED_SIZE]; 
    msg.rm_call.cb_cred.oa_base = cred_area; 
    msg.rm_call.cb_verf.oa_base = &(cred_area[MAX_AUTH_BYTES]); 
   
-   /* 
-  
-   Authenication is done in this function. 
-  
-   */ 
-   printf("kdebug: in svc_getreq_common\n"); // kandy 
-  
    xprt = xports[fd]; 
    /* Do we control fd? */ 
42 
    if (xprt == NULL) 
       return; 
   
--- 408,417 ---- 
*************** 
*** 501,518 **** 
     else 
       svcerr_noprog (xprt); 
     /* Fall through to ... */ 
   } 
      call_done: 
-  
-     /*  
-  
-     Now the message is done through the authenication phase. 
-      
-     */ 
-     printf("kdebug: at call_done\n"); // kandy 
-  
        if ((stat = SVC_STAT (xprt)) == XPRT_DIED) 
   { 
     SVC_DESTROY (xprt); 
     break; 
   } 
--- 479,488 ---- 
 
 
C. PORTMAPPER DIFF FILES 
  
*** portmap.c 2004-03-22 08:35:58.000000000 -0800 
--- /home/tux/portmap/stock/portmap_5beta/portmap.c 1996-07-06 
14:06:24.000000000 -0700 
*************** 
*** 88,106 **** 
  #include <sys/socket.h> 
  #include <sys/ioctl.h> 
  #include <sys/wait.h> 
  #include <sys/signal.h> 
  #include <sys/time.h> 
-  
-  
- #include <fcntl.h> 
- /* 
- #include <unistd.h> 
- #include <sys/types.h> 
- #include <sys/stat.h> 
- */ 
-  
  #include <sys/resource.h> 
  #ifdef SYSV40 
  #include <netinet/in.h> 
  #endif 
   
--- 88,97 ---- 
*************** 
43 
*** 155,241 **** 
  #ifndef INADDR_LOOPBACK 
  #define INADDR_LOOPBACK ntohl(inet_addr("127.0.0.1")) 
  #endif 
  #endif 
   
-  
- #define syslog(a,b) kandy_syslog(a, b) 
- #include "kandydbg.h" 
-  
- int logfilefd = 0; 
- int kandbgfd; 
-  
- int kandy_syslog(type,bufp )  
- int type; char *bufp; { 
-  
-  int len = 0; 
-  
- /* 
-  len = strlen(bufp); 
-  
-  write(logfilefd, bufp, len);  
-  write(logfilefd, "\n", 1); 
- */ 
- // write(logfilefd, "there was an error\n", 19); 
- // write(logfilefd, "it shouldn't die here\n", 19); 
-  dprintf(logfilefd, "in kandy's syslog print\n"); 
-  





  main(argc, argv) 
   int argc; 
   char **argv; 
  { 
   SVCXPRT *xprt; 
   int sock, c; 
   struct sockaddr_in addr; 
   int len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); 
   register struct pmaplist *pml; 
- int kandret = 0; 
-  
-  




- if (logfilefd < 0 ) { 




- //write(logfilefd, "starting log file portmaplog\n", 18); 
-  
- // dprintf(logfilefd, "starting log file portmaplog\n"); 
44 
-  




- Redirect stdin, stdout, stderr to a log file, 






- dup2(logfilefd, 0); 
- dup2(logfilefd, 1); 
- dup2(logfilefd, 2); 
-  
- /* 
- kandbgfd = open("/tmp/kandydbg", O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_APPEND, 
S_IRWXU); 
-  
- if (kandbgfd < 0 ) { 





- //  dprintf(kandbgfd, "staring log file\n"); 
-  
   
   while ((c = getopt(argc, argv, "dv")) != EOF) { 
    switch (c) { 
   
    case 'd': 
--- 146,164 ---- 
*************** 
*** 252,279 **** 
     (void) fprintf(stderr, "-v: verbose logging\n"); 
     exit(1); 
    } 
   } 
   
- write(logfilefd, "before daemon\n", 14); 
-   dprintf(kandbgfd, "before daemon\n"); 
-  
   if (!debugging && daemon(0, 0)) { 
! //  (void) fprintf(stderr, "portmap: fork: %s", 
strerror(errno)); 
!   dprintf(kandbgfd, "portmap: fork: %s", strerror(errno)); 
    exit(1); 
   } 
-   dprintf(kandbgfd, "after daemon\n"); 
   
! #ifdef FACILITY 
!  openlog("portmap", debugging ? LOG_PID | LOG_PERROR : LOG_PID, 
FACILITY); 
  #else 
   openlog("portmap", debugging ? LOG_PID | LOG_PERROR : LOG_PID); 
45 
  #endif 
- write(logfilefd, "before socket\n", 14); 
-  
-  
   
   if ((sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_UDP)) < 0) { 
    syslog(LOG_ERR, "cannot create udp socket: %m"); 
    exit(1); 
   } 
--- 175,195 ---- 
     (void) fprintf(stderr, "-v: verbose logging\n"); 
     exit(1); 
    } 
   } 
   
   if (!debugging && daemon(0, 0)) { 
!   (void) fprintf(stderr, "portmap: fork: %s", 
strerror(errno)); 
    exit(1); 
   } 
   
! #ifdef LOG_MAIL 
!  openlog("portmap", debugging ? LOG_PID | LOG_PERROR : LOG_PID, 
!      FACILITY); 
  #else 
   openlog("portmap", debugging ? LOG_PID | LOG_PERROR : LOG_PID); 
  #endif 
   
   if ((sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_UDP)) < 0) { 
    syslog(LOG_ERR, "cannot create udp socket: %m"); 
    exit(1); 
   } 
*************** 
*** 287,297 **** 
   addr.sin_port = htons(PMAPPORT); 
   if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, len) != 0) { 
    syslog(LOG_ERR, "cannot bind udp: %m"); 
    exit(1); 
   } 
- write(logfilefd, "before socket\n", 14); 
   
   if ((xprt = svcudp_create(sock)) == (SVCXPRT *)NULL) { 
    syslog(LOG_ERR, "couldn't do udp_create"); 
    exit(1); 
   } 
--- 203,212 ---- 
*************** 
*** 381,392 **** 
  void 
  perror(what) 
   const char *what; 
  { 
   
!  //syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: %m", what); 
!  syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: %m"); 
  } 
  #endif 
46 
   
  static struct pmaplist * 
  find_service(prog, vers, prot) 
--- 296,306 ---- 
  void 
  perror(what) 
   const char *what; 
  { 
   
!  syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: %m", what); 
  } 
  #endif 
   
  static struct pmaplist * 
  find_service(prog, vers, prot) 
*************** 
*** 743,759 **** 
   /* 
    * fork a child to do the work.  Parent immediately returns. 
    * Child exits upon completion. 
    */ 
   if ((pid = fork()) != 0) { 
!   if (pid < 0) { 
!  
!    //syslog(LOG_ERR, "CALLIT (prog %lu): fork: %m", 
!     //   a.rmt_prog); 
!  
!    syslog(LOG_ERR, "CALLIT (prog %lu): fork: %m"); 
! } 
    return; 
   } 
   port = pml->pml_map.pm_port; 
   get_myaddress(&me); 
   me.sin_port = htons(port); 
--- 657,669 ---- 
   /* 
    * fork a child to do the work.  Parent immediately returns. 
    * Child exits upon completion. 
    */ 
   if ((pid = fork()) != 0) { 
!   if (pid < 0) 
!    syslog(LOG_ERR, "CALLIT (prog %lu): fork: %m", 
!        a.rmt_prog); 
    return; 
   } 
   port = pml->pml_map.pm_port; 
   get_myaddress(&me); 
   me.sin_port = htons(port); 
 
 
*** pmap_check.c Sun Mar 28 21:26:09 2004 
--- /home/tux/portmap/stock/portmap_5beta/pmap_check.c Sun Jul  7 
08:49:10 1996 
*************** 
*** 35,46 **** 
  #ifndef lint 
  static char sccsid[] = "@(#) pmap_check.c 1.8 96/07/07 10:49:10"; 
47 
  #endif 
   
  #include <rpc/rpc.h> 
! //#include <rpc/pmap_prot.h> 
! #include "pmap_prot.h" 
  #include <syslog.h> 
  #include <netdb.h> 
  #include <sys/signal.h> 
  #ifdef SYSV40 
  #include <netinet/in.h> 
--- 35,45 ---- 
  #ifndef lint 
  static char sccsid[] = "@(#) pmap_check.c 1.8 96/07/07 10:49:10"; 
  #endif 
   
  #include <rpc/rpc.h> 
! #include <rpc/pmap_prot.h> 
  #include <syslog.h> 
  #include <netdb.h> 
  #include <sys/signal.h> 
  #ifdef SYSV40 
  #include <netinet/in.h> 
*************** 
*** 100,124 **** 
   
      /* 
       * Give up root privileges so that we can never allocate a 
privileged 
       * port when forwarding an rpc request. 
       */ 
-  
-     /* 
-  
-     setuid is not implemented properly on the XTS-400 
-     so it is not used. 
-  
-     */ 
-  
- /* 
      if (setuid(1) == -1) { 
   syslog(LOG_ERR, "setuid(1) failed: %m"); 
   exit(1); 
      } 
- */ 
-  
      (void) signal(SIGINT, toggle_verboselog); 
  } 
   
  /* check_default - additional checks for NULL, DUMP, GETPORT and 
unknown */ 
   
--- 99,112 ---- 
*************** 
*** 167,197 **** 
  u_long  prog; 
  u_long  port; 
  { 
48 
      struct sockaddr_in *addr = svc_getcaller(xprt); 
   
- /*  
-  
- The privileged port check is not applicable 
- on the XTS-400, so it is not used. 
-  
- */ 
- #ifdef KANDY_SEC_TEST 
-  
      if (xprt != ludp_xprt && xprt != ltcp_xprt) { 
  #ifdef HOSTS_ACCESS 
   (void) good_client(addr);  /* because of side effects */ 
  #endif 
   log_bad_owner(addr, proc, prog); 
   return (FALSE); 
      } 
      if (port && !check_privileged_port(addr, proc, prog, port)) 
   return (FALSE); 
-  
- #endif 
-  printf("kandy, in check_setuset\n"); 
-  
      if (verboselog) 
   log_client(addr, proc, prog); 
      return (TRUE); 
  } 
   
--- 155,173 ---- 
*************** 
*** 201,232 **** 
  struct sockaddr_in *addr; 
  u_long  proc; 
  u_long  prog; 
  u_long  port; 
  { 
-  
- /*  
-  
- The privileged port check is not applicable 
- on the XTS-400, so it is not used. 
-  
- */ 
- #ifdef KANDY_SEC_TEST 
-  
      if (!from_local(addr)) { 
  #ifdef HOSTS_ACCESS 
   (void) good_client(addr);  /* because of side effects */ 
  #endif 
   log_bad_owner(addr, proc, prog); 
   return (FALSE); 
      } 
      if (port && !check_privileged_port(addr, proc, prog, port)) 





-  printf("kandy2, in check_setuset\n"); 
      if (verboselog) 
   log_client(addr, proc, prog); 
      return (TRUE); 
  } 
   
--- 177,195 ---- 
 
*** from_local.c Sun Mar 28 21:26:43 2004 
--- /home/tux/portmap/stock/portmap_5beta/from_local.c Fri May 31 
13:52:58 1996 
*************** 
*** 104,163 **** 
      struct ifreq *the_end; 
      int     sock; 
      char    buf[BUFSIZ]; 
   
      /* 
-  
-     This struct is used to return the local IP address 
-  
-     */ 
-     struct in_addr localinaddr; 
-  
-     /* 
-  
-     Set the s_addr structure to "127.0.0.1" 
-  
-     */ 
-     localinaddr.s_addr = 16777343;  
-  
-  
-     /* 
-  
-     If the global addrs array which contains the information 
-     of what the server should set it IP address is not yet 
-     set, then set it. 
-  
-     */ 
-  if (num_addrs < 1) { 
-   grow_addrs(); 
-   //addrs[0].sin_family =  2; 
-   addrs[0] = localinaddr; 
-   //memcpy(addrs[0].sin_zero , "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0", 7); 
-   num_addrs = 1; 
-  } 
-  






- This is the original find_local function which does not function 




- #ifdef KANDY_SEC_TEST 
- find_local() 
- { 
-     struct ifconf ifc; 
-     struct ifreq ifreq; 
-     struct ifreq *ifr; 
-     struct ifreq *the_end; 
-     int     sock; 
-     char    buf[BUFSIZ]; 
-  
-     /* 
       * Get list of network interfaces. We use a huge buffer to allow 
for the 
       * presence of non-IP interfaces. 
       */ 
   
      if ((sock = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0)) < 0) { 
--- 104,113 ---- 
*************** 
*** 200,211 **** 
      } 
      (void) close(sock); 
      return (num_local); 
  } 
   
- #endif 
-  
  /* from_local - determine whether request comes from the local system 
*/ 
   
  from_local(addr) 
  struct sockaddr_in *addr; 
  { 
--- 150,159 ---- 
 
 
*** daemon.c 2004-03-22 08:14:51.000000000 -0800 
--- /home/tux/portmap/stock/portmap_5beta/daemon.c 1992-06-11 
13:53:12.000000000 -0700 
*************** 
*** 43,91 **** 
  #define STDERR_FILENO 2 
   
  /* From paths.h */ 
  #define _PATH_DEVNULL "/dev/null" 
   
- /* 
-  
- This header file contains necessary 
- function for output message that are helpful 
- for debugging. 
-  
- */ 
- #include "kandydgb.h" 
-  
  daemon(nochdir, noclose) 
   int nochdir, noclose; 
51 
  { 
   int cpid; 
   
-  /* 
-  
-  This function is enter when the portmapper is run without 
-  the foreground flag. 
-  
-  */ 
-  dprintf(kandbgfd, "in daemon() \n"); 
-  
   if ((cpid = fork()) == -1) 
    return (-1); 
   if (cpid) 
    exit(0); 
-  
-  /* 
-  
-  This is use to see if the setsid will work 
-  on the XTS system. 
-  
-  */ 
-  dprintf(kandbgfd, "before setsid() \n"); 
-  
   (void) setsid(); 
-  
-  dprintf(kandbgfd, "after setsid() \n"); 
-  
   if (!nochdir) 
    (void) chdir("/"); 
   if (!noclose) { 
    int devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0); 
   
--- 43,62 ---- 
 
 
D. MOUNTD AND NFSD DIFF FILES 
 
*** daemon.c 2004-03-22 08:14:51.000000000 -0800 
--- /home/tux/portmap/stock/portmap_5beta/daemon.c 1992-06-11 
13:53:12.000000000 -0700 
*************** 
*** 43,91 **** 
  #define STDERR_FILENO 2 
   
  /* From paths.h */ 
  #define _PATH_DEVNULL "/dev/null" 
   
- /* 
-  
- This header file contains necessary 
- function for output message that are helpful 




- #include "kandydgb.h" 
-  
  daemon(nochdir, noclose) 
   int nochdir, noclose; 
  { 
   int cpid; 
   
-  /* 
-  
-  This function is enter when the portmapper is run without 
-  the foreground flag. 
-  
-  */ 
-  dprintf(kandbgfd, "in daemon() \n"); 
-  
   if ((cpid = fork()) == -1) 
    return (-1); 
   if (cpid) 
    exit(0); 
-  
-  /* 
-  
-  This is use to see if the setsid will work 
-  on the XTS system. 
-  
-  */ 
-  dprintf(kandbgfd, "before setsid() \n"); 
-  
   (void) setsid(); 
-  
-  dprintf(kandbgfd, "after setsid() \n"); 
-  
   if (!nochdir) 
    (void) chdir("/"); 
   if (!noclose) { 
    int devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0); 
   
--- 43,62 ---- 
 
 
*** fh.c Sat Mar 27 22:44:07 2004 
--- /home/tux/nfs/stock/nfs-server-2.2beta46/fh.c Mon Nov 23 
13:08:11 1998 
*************** 
*** 143,154 **** 
  static void fh_unlink_fdcache(fhcache *fhc); 
   
  static void 
  fh_move_to_front(fhcache *fhc) 
  { 
- printf("kdebug: in fh_move_to_front\n"); 
-  
   /* Remove from current posn */ 
   fhc->prev->next = fhc->next; 
   fhc->next->prev = fhc->prev; 
   
53 
   /* Insert at head */ 
--- 143,152 ---- 
*************** 
*** 178,188 **** 
   
  static fhcache * 
  fh_lookup(psi_t psi) 
  { 
   register fhcache *fhc; 
- printf("kdebug: in fh_lookup\n"); 
   
   fhc = fh_hashed[psi % HASH_TAB_SIZE]; 
   while (fhc != NULL && fhc->h.psi != psi) 
    fhc = fhc->hash_next; 
   return (fhc); 
--- 176,185 ---- 
*************** 
*** 536,560 **** 
   char  *slash_stack[HP_LEN]; 
   struct stat sbuf; 
   psi_t  psi; 
   int  i; 
   
- int y = 0; 
- printf("kdebug: in fh_buildpath, dump: %s\n", fh_dump(h)); 
-  
   if (h->hash_path[0] >= HP_LEN) { 
    Dprintf(L_ERROR, "impossible hash_path[0] value: %s\n",  
       fh_dump(h)); 
    return NULL; 
   } 
   
- printf("kdebug: before efs_stat 1\n"); 
   if (efs_stat("/", &sbuf) < 0) 
    return (NULL); 
   psi = pseudo_inode(sbuf.st_ino, sbuf.st_dev); 
   if (h->hash_path[0] == 0) { 
- printf("kdebug: hash_path[0] is zero\n"); 
    if (psi != h->psi) 
     return (NULL); 
    return xstrdup("/"); 
   } 
   /* else */ 
--- 533,552 ---- 
*************** 
*** 562,675 **** 
    return (NULL); 
   
   auth_override_uid(ROOT_UID); /* for x-only dirs */ 
   strcpy(pathbuf, "/"); 
   cookie_stack[2] = 0; 
- y = 0; 
   for (i = 2; i <= h->hash_path[0] + 1; i++) { 
    DIR *dir; 
    struct dirent *dp; 
   




- printf("kdebug: before efs_stat 2, cookie is:%i\n", cookie_stack[i]); 




- This is necessary to detect an infinite loop because a different 
semantic 
- implementation of seekdir and readdir. It will return with an error 
- is an infinite loop is detected. 
-  
- */ 
- if (y > 5) { 
- printf("kdebug: looks like going to be stuck in for loop, 
leaving\n"); 
-  
- return (NULL); 
- } 
-  
    if (efs_stat(pathbuf, &sbuf) >= 0 
        && (dir = efs_opendir(pathbuf)) != NULL) { 
!    if (cookie_stack[i] != 0){ 
!    printf("kdebug: cookie setting, index:%i\n", 
cookie_stack[i]); 
      efs_seekdir(dir, cookie_stack[i]); 
- /* 
-   
- The way the combination of seekdir works with readdir, is that 
- readdir will start reading from the entry set by seekdir. 
- This is different from the way Linux work, which has readdir 
- start after the offset set by seekdir. That's why an extra 
- readdir is needed here. This can be tested when there is hash 
- collision when trying to resolve a directory name.  
-  
- */ 
-     efs_readdir(dir); // eat an entry 
- } 
     while ((dp = efs_readdir(dir))) { 
- printf("kdebug: ck:%i, dp->dname is: %s\n", dp->d_off, dp->d_name); 
      if (strcmp(dp->d_name, ".") != 0 
!         && strcmp(dp->d_name, "..") != 0 
!  
! //&& strcmp(dp->d_name, "dev") != 0 
!  
! ) { 
! // add for debugging, remove later 
       psi = pseudo_inode(dp->d_ino, 
sbuf.st_dev); 
- printf("i: %i, h0-%i, h0x-%x,,hpi:%x, ", i,  h->hash_path[0], h-
>hash_path[0], h->hash_path[i] ); 
- printf("^^psi %x, h->psi %x, hash %x,,", psi, h->psi, hash_psi(psi)); 
- printf("i: %i, :d_ino-%i st_dev-%i|\n",  
- i, dp->d_ino, sbuf.st_dev ); 
       if (i == h->hash_path[0] + 1) { 
        if (psi == h->psi) { 
         /*GOT IT*/ 
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         strcat(pathbuf, dp->d_name); 
- printf("kdebug: pathbuf 2 is: %s\n", pathbuf); 
         path = xstrdup(pathbuf); 
         efs_closedir(dir); 
         auth_override_uid(auth_uid); 
         return (path); 
        } 
       } else { 
- printf("kdebug: in else of pathbuf 2, is: %s\n", pathbuf); 
-  
-  
        if (hash_psi(psi) == h-
>hash_path[i]) { 
         /*PERHAPS WE'VE GOT IT */ 
         cookie_stack[i] = 
efs_telldir(dir); 
         cookie_stack[i + 1] = 0; 
         slash_stack[i] = pathbuf + 
strlen(pathbuf); 
         strcpy(slash_stack[i], dp-
>d_name); 
         strcat(pathbuf, "/"); 
- printf("kdebug: ck:%i, pathbuf 3 is now: %s, %x, %x\n", 
cookie_stack[i], pathbuf, h->hash_path[i], hash_psi(psi)); 
   
         efs_closedir(dir); 
         goto deeper; 
        } 
       } 
      } 
     } 
     /* dp == NULL */ 
     efs_closedir(dir); 
-   } else { 
- if (efs_stat(pathbuf, &sbuf) < 0) printf("kdebug: efs_stat is <0 in 
else\n"); 
- if (dir == NULL) printf("kdebug: dir is null in else\n"); 
-  
-  
    } 
-  
    /* shallower */ 
    i--; 
    if (i < 2) { 
- printf("kdebug: search exhausted\n"); 
     auth_override_uid(auth_uid); 
     return (NULL); /* SEARCH EXHAUSTED */ 
    } 
   
    /* Prune path */ 
    *(slash_stack[i]) = '\0'; 
- printf("kdebug: it was pruned, path is:%s\n", pathbuf); 
    goto backtrack; 
   deeper: 
    ; 
   } 
   auth_override_uid(auth_uid); 
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--- 554,612 ---- 
    return (NULL); 
   
   auth_override_uid(ROOT_UID); /* for x-only dirs */ 
   strcpy(pathbuf, "/"); 
   cookie_stack[2] = 0; 
   for (i = 2; i <= h->hash_path[0] + 1; i++) { 
    DIR *dir; 
    struct dirent *dp; 
   
   backtrack: 
    if (efs_stat(pathbuf, &sbuf) >= 0 
        && (dir = efs_opendir(pathbuf)) != NULL) { 
!    if (cookie_stack[i] != 0) 
      efs_seekdir(dir, cookie_stack[i]); 
     while ((dp = efs_readdir(dir))) { 
      if (strcmp(dp->d_name, ".") != 0 
!         && strcmp(dp->d_name, "..") != 0) { 
       psi = pseudo_inode(dp->d_ino, 
sbuf.st_dev); 
       if (i == h->hash_path[0] + 1) { 
        if (psi == h->psi) { 
         /*GOT IT*/ 
         strcat(pathbuf, dp->d_name); 
         path = xstrdup(pathbuf); 
         efs_closedir(dir); 
         auth_override_uid(auth_uid); 
         return (path); 
        } 
       } else { 
        if (hash_psi(psi) == h-
>hash_path[i]) { 
         /*PERHAPS WE'VE GOT IT */ 
         cookie_stack[i] = 
efs_telldir(dir); 
         cookie_stack[i + 1] = 0; 
         slash_stack[i] = pathbuf + 
strlen(pathbuf); 
         strcpy(slash_stack[i], dp-
>d_name); 
         strcat(pathbuf, "/"); 
   
         efs_closedir(dir); 
         goto deeper; 
        } 
       } 
      } 
     } 
     /* dp == NULL */ 
     efs_closedir(dir); 
    } 
    /* shallower */ 
    i--; 
    if (i < 2) { 
     auth_override_uid(auth_uid); 
     return (NULL); /* SEARCH EXHAUSTED */ 
    } 
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    /* Prune path */ 
    *(slash_stack[i]) = '\0'; 
    goto backtrack; 
   deeper: 
    ; 
   } 
   auth_override_uid(auth_uid); 
*************** 
*** 733,743 **** 
    Dprintf(L_ERROR, "impossible hash_path[0] value: %s\n",  
       fh_dump(h)); 
    return NULL; 
   } 
   
- printf("kdebug: before efs_stat 3\n"); 
   if (efs_stat("/", &sbuf) < 0) 
    return (NULL); 
   psi = pseudo_inode(sbuf.st_ino, sbuf.st_dev); 
   
   if (h->hash_path[0] == 0) { 
--- 670,679 ---- 
*************** 
*** 753,763 **** 
   i = 2; 
   cookie_stack[i] = 0; 
   while (i <= h->hash_path[0] + 1) { 
    DIR *dir; 
   
- printf("kdebug: before efs_stat 4\n"); 
    if (efs_stat(pathbuf, &sbuf) >= 0 
        && (dir = efs_opendir(pathbuf)) != NULL) { 
     if (cookie_stack[i] != 0) 
      efs_seekdir(dir, cookie_stack[i]); 
     if (!fh_buildcomp(h, sbuf.st_dev, dir, i, pathbuf)) { 
--- 689,698 ---- 
*************** 
*** 877,888 **** 
  fh_find(svc_fh *h, int mode) 
  { 
   register fhcache *fhc, *flush; 
   int   check; 
   
- printf("kdebug: in fh_find\n"); 
-  
   check = (mode & FHFIND_CHECK); 
   mode &= 0xF; 
   
  #ifdef FHTRACE 
   if (h->hash_path[0] >= HP_LEN) { 
--- 812,821 ---- 
*************** 
*** 914,924 **** 
     */ 
    if (check) { 
     struct stat *s = &fhc->attrs; 
     psi_t  psi; 
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     nfsstat  dummy; 
- printf("kdebug: fh_find, rebuilding path for file\n"); 
   
     if (efs_lstat(fhc->path, s) < 0) { 
      Dprintf(D_FHTRACE, 
       "fh_find: stale fh: lstat: %m\n"); 
     } else { 
--- 847,856 ---- 
 
 
*** logging.c 2004-03-22 09:02:45.000000000 -0800 
--- /home/tux/nfs/stock/nfs-server-2.2beta46/logging.c 1998-10-30 
08:11:22.000000000 -0800 
*************** 
*** 13,25 **** 
   *  as is, with no warranty expressed or implied. 
   */ 
   
  #include "nfsd.h" 
   
- // This is necessary to compile successfully 
- #include <time.h> 
-  
  #ifdef HAVE_SYSLOG_H 
  #include <syslog.h> 
  #else 
  #define LOG_FILE "/var/tmp/%s.log" 
  #endif 
--- 13,22 ---- 
 
 
*** mountd.c 2004-03-20 08:11:52.000000000 -0800 
--- /home/tux/nfs/stock/nfs-server-2.2beta46/mountd.c 1999-06-02 
05:10:33.000000000 -0700 
*************** 
*** 75,87 **** 
  static char *program_name; 
  int  need_reinit = 0; 
  int  need_flush = 0; 
  extern char version[]; 
   
- // file descriptor for log file 
- int kandbgfd; 
-  
  /* 
   * NULL 
   * Do nothing 
   */ 
  void * 
--- 75,84 ---- 
*************** 
*** 132,172 **** 
   
   /* Now authenticate the intruder... */ 
   if (((cp = auth_clnt(rqstp)) == NULL)  
     || (mp = auth_path(cp, rqstp, argbuf)) == NULL 




- printf("kdebug: in authenticaton\n") ; // kandy 
-  
    res->fhs_status = NFSERR_ACCES; 
  #ifdef WANT_LOG_MOUNTS 
    Dprintf(L_WARNING, "Blocked attempt of %s to mount %s\n", 
                  inet_ntoa(addr), argbuf);   
  #endif /* WANT_LOG_MOUNTS */ 
    Dprintf (D_CALL, "\tmount res = %d\n", res->fhs_status); 
    return (res); 
   } 
- printf("kdebug: after blocking authenticaton\n") ; // kandy 
   
   /* Check the file. We can now return valid results to the 
    * client. */ 
   if ((errno = saved_errno) != 0 || stat(argbuf, &stbuf) < 0) { 
    res->fhs_status = nfs_errno(); 
    Dprintf (D_CALL, "\tmount res = %d\n", res->fhs_status); 
-  
-  
- printf("kdebug: returning with errno\n") ; // kandy 
-  
    return (res); 
   } 
   
   if (!S_ISDIR(stbuf.st_mode) && !S_ISREG(stbuf.st_mode)) { 
- printf("kdebug: nfserr_notdir\n") ; // kandy 
    res->fhs_status = NFSERR_NOTDIR; 
   } else if (!re_export && nfsmounted(argbuf, &stbuf)) { 
- printf("kdebug: nfserr_acces\n") ; // kandy 
    res->fhs_status = NFSERR_ACCES; 
   } else { 
    res->fhs_status = fh_create((nfs_fh *) 
     &(res->fhstatus_u.fhs_fhandle), argbuf); 
    rmtab_add_client(argbuf, rqstp); 
--- 129,158 ---- 
*************** 
*** 174,184 **** 
    Dprintf(L_NOTICE, "%s has been mounted by %s\n", 
       argbuf, inet_ntoa(addr)); 
  #endif /* WANT_LOG_MOUNTS */ 
   } 
   Dprintf (D_CALL, "\tmount res = %d\n", res->fhs_status); 
- printf("kdebug: after mounted\n") ; // kandy 
   return (res); 
  } 
   
  /* 
   * DUMP 
--- 160,169 ---- 
*************** 
*** 324,349 **** 
   int port = 0; 
   int c; 
   
   program_name = argv[0]; 
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-  
- kandbgfd =      open("/tmp/mountdlog", O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_APPEND, 
S_IRWXU); 
-  
- if (kandbgfd < 0 ) { 







- dup2(kandbgfd, 0); 
- dup2(kandbgfd, 1); 
- dup2(kandbgfd, 2); 
-  
-  
   /* Parse the command line options and arguments. */ 
   opterr = 0; 
   while ((c = getopt_long(argc, argv, shortopts, longopts, NULL)) 
!= EOF) 
    switch (c) { 
    case 'F': 
--- 309,318 ---- 
 
 
*** nfsd.c 2004-03-20 08:11:50.000000000 -0800 
--- /home/tux/nfs/stock/nfs-server-2.2beta46/nfsd.c 1999-08-29 
08:19:29.000000000 -0700 
*************** 
*** 46,57 **** 
  static char pathbuf_1[NFS_MAXPATHLEN + NFS_MAXNAMLEN + 1]; 
   
  extern char version[]; 
  static char *program_name; 
   
- int kpnfsfd; 
-  
  /* 
   * Option table 
   */ 
  static struct option longopts[] = { 
        { "auth-deamon",  required_argument, 0, 'a' 
}, 
--- 46,55 ---- 
*************** 
*** 119,138 **** 
  auth_fh(struct svc_req *rqstp, nfs_fh *fh, nfsstat *statp, int flags) 
  { 
   static int total = 0, cached = 0; 
   fhcache  *fhc; 
   
- printf("kdebug: in auth_fh\n"); // kandy 
-  
   /* Try to map FH. If not cached, reconstruct path with root priv 
*/ 
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   fhc = fh_find((svc_fh *)fh, FHFIND_FEXISTS|FHFIND_CHECK); 
   if (fhc == NULL) { 
    *statp = NFSERR_STALE; 
- printf("kdebug: returning nfserr_stale\n"); // kandy 
    return NULL; 
   } 
- printf("kdebug: after fh_find\n"); // kandy 
   
   /* Try to retrieve last client who accessed this fh */ 
   if (nfsclient == NULL) { 
    struct in_addr caddr; 
   
--- 117,132 ---- 
*************** 
*** 140,159 **** 
    if (fhc->last_clnt != NULL && 
        fhc->last_clnt->clnt_addr.s_addr == caddr.s_addr) { 
     nfsclient = fhc->last_clnt; 
    } else if ((nfsclient = auth_clnt(rqstp)) == NULL) { 
     *statp = NFSERR_ACCES; 
- printf("kdebug: returning nfserr_acces 1 in auth_fh\n"); 
     return NULL; 
    } 
   } 
   
   if (fhc->last_clnt == nfsclient) { 
    nfsmount = fhc->last_mount; /* get cached mount point */ 
    cached++; 
   } else { 
- printf("kdebug: before auth_path\n"); 
    nfsmount = auth_path(nfsclient, rqstp, fhc->path); 
    if (nfsmount == NULL) { 
     *statp = NFSERR_ACCES; 
     return NULL; 
    } 
--- 134,151 ---- 
*************** 
*** 171,191 **** 
       ((flags & CHK_NOACCESS) || strcmp(nfsmount->path, fhc-
>path))) { 
    struct in_addr addr = svc_getcaller(rqstp->rq_xprt)-
>sin_addr; 
    Dprintf(L_WARNING, "client %s tried to access %s 
(noaccess)\n", 
      inet_ntoa(addr), fhc->path); 
    *statp = NFSERR_ACCES; 
- printf("kdebug: returning nfserr_acces\n"); 
    return NULL; 
   } 
   
   if ((flags & CHK_WRITE) && (nfsmount->o.read_only || read_only)) 
{ 
    *statp = NFSERR_ROFS; 
- printf("kdebug: returning nfserr_rofs\n"); // kandy 
    return NULL; 
   } 
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- printf("kdebug: before auth_user\n"); // kandy 
   auth_user(nfsmount, rqstp); 
   
   *statp = NFS_OK; 
   return fhc; 
  } 
--- 163,180 ---- 
*************** 
*** 255,273 **** 
  nfsd_nfsproc_getattr_2(nfs_fh *argp, struct svc_req *rqstp) 
  { 
   nfsstat status; 
   fhcache *fhc; 
   
- printf("kdebug: in nfsd_nfsproc_getattr_2\n"); // kandy 
- printf("kdebug: argp(nfs_fh) is %s\n", argp->data); 
-  
   fhc = auth_fh(rqstp, argp, &status, CHK_READ); 
   if (fhc == NULL) 
    return status; 
   
- printf("kdebug: fhc is not NULL\n"); // kandy 
-  
   return (fhc_getattr(fhc, &result.attrstat.attrstat_u.attributes, 
        NULL, rqstp)); 
  } 
   
  int 
--- 244,257 ---- 
*************** 
*** 985,1011 **** 
   int c; 
  #ifdef MULTIPLE_SERVERS 
   int i, ncopies = 1; 
  #endif 
   
- // int kpnfsfd; 
-  
-  
- kpnfsfd =      open("/tmp/nfsdlog", O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_APPEND, 
S_IRWXU); 
-  
- if (kpnfsfd < 0 ) { 







- dup2(kpnfsfd, 0); 
- dup2(kpnfsfd, 1); 
- dup2(kpnfsfd, 2); 
-  
   program_name = argv[0]; 
   chdir("/"); 
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   /* Parse the command line options and arguments. */ 
   opterr = 0; 
--- 969,978 ---- 
 
 
*** nfsmounted.c 2004-03-22 09:07:13.000000000 -0800 
--- /home/tux/nfs/stock/nfs-server-2.2beta46/nfsmounted.c 1997-12-12 
06:03:52.000000000 -0800 
*************** 
*** 59,78 **** 
  #endif 
   
  int 
  nfsmounted(const char *path, struct stat *sbp) 




- major is not implemented properly on the XTS-400, 
- so it is not used. 
-  
- */ 
- #ifdef KANDY_TAKEOUT 
  #ifdef __linux__ 
   return major(sbp->st_dev) == 0; 
  #endif 
-  
- #endif 
   return 0; 
  } 




























APPENDIX B: SOFTWARE LISTING 
This section lists the software environment/source code used for the port, 








The source code for the portmapper. 
glibc library:  
http://carroll.aset.psu.edu/pub/linux/distributions/redhat/redhat/linux/8.0/en/os/i38
6/SRPMS/glibc-2.2.93-5.src.rpm 
This is source code for the GNU C library. 
Slackware 7.0: 
http://carroll.aset.psu.edu/pub/linux/distributions/slackware/slackware-7.0/ 
This was the first development environment used to get the nfsd userland 
software working and to get an initial understanding of how it works. 
Redhat 8.0:  
http://carroll.aset.psu.edu/pub/linux/distributions/redhat/redhat/linux/8.0/ 
This is the second development environment used after familiarity of nfsd 
was already achieved.  This system became the main development environment 
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APPENDIX C: ADMINISTERING NFS 
A. COMPONENT COMPILATION 
This section will provide instructions on how to compile the various NFS 
components. 
Compiling the GLIBC library: 
1. Go into the directory extracted from the GLIBC zip file.  
2. Run “make”.  If there are compilation errors, make sure to remove 
the temporary file “sysd-versions”. 
3. The important binaries created from “make” are “libc.a”, “libc.map”, 
“libc.so”, and “libc_nonshared.a”.  Copy these binaries into a 
directory where the library binaries should be stored, such as 
“/home/kandy/src/lib”. 
4. Create a symbolic link to the dynamic library “libc.so” by running “ln 
–s libc.so libc.so.6”.  This is necessary so that the loader can 
resolve dynamic library dependencies. 
5. In order for a program to use the newly created library, it needs to 
set the environment variable LD_LIBRARY_PATH to the directory 
that contains the new library.  This can be done by running “export 
LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/home/kandy/src/lib”. 
 
Compiling the portmapper: 
1. Go into the directory extracted from the portmap zip file. 
2. Run “make USE_GLIBC=1 portmap”.  The “USE_GLIBC=1” 




Compiling the mountd/nfsd daemon: 
1. Go into the directory extracted from the mountd/nfsd zip file. 
2. Run “./BUILD”.  This will prompt the user with questions for how the 
mountd and nfsd daemons should be configured.  The following 
answers should be used: 
· no to new inode number scheme 
· no to R/W support for multiple daemons 
· no to dynamic UID mapping 
· no to NIS UID mapping 
· 0 for UID of /etc/exports 
· 0 for GID of /etc/exports 
· no for HOST ACCESS check 
· yes to log to syslog 
3. Run “make rpc.mountd rpc.nfsd”. 
 
B. COMPONENT EXECUTION 
This section will provide instructions on how to run the various NFS 
daemons. 
Running portmap: 
1. Make sure the log files in the “/tmp” directory are deleted. 
2. Use sl to change the user’s security level to “min” security and 
“max” integrity. 
3. Run tp_edit to move the portmap binary into a privileged directory 
so that it can be run in daemon mode.  Use “cd” to change the 
current working directory to “/system”.  Use “add” and set the 
program name to “portmap”, the pathname to 
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“/home/kandy/trans/nfs_bin/portmap”, and leave the defaults for the 
rest of the settings.  
4. Run daemon_edit to configure how portmap should be run.  Use 
“add” and set the name to “portmap”, the commandline to 
“portmap”, the argument to “-d”, the environment variable to 
“LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/home/kandy/src/lib”, no for startup, sl0 for 
security level, il3 for integrity level, username to “network”, group 
name to “stop”, yes for High Integrity, and leave the defaults for the 
rest of the settings. 




1. Make sure the log files in the “/tmp” directory are deleted. 
2. Use sl to change the user’s security level to “min” security and 
“max” integrity. 
3. Run tp_edit to move the mountd binary into a privileged directory so 
that it can be run in daemon mode.  Use “cd” to change the current 
working directory to “/system”.  Use “add” and set the program 
name to “mountd”, the pathname to 
“/home/kandy/trans/nfs_bin/rpc.mountd”, and leave the defaults for 
the rest of the settings.  
4. Run daemon_edit to configure how mountd should be run.  Use 
“add” and set the name to “mountd”, the commandline to “mountd”, 
the argument to “-F”, the environment variable to 
“LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/home/kandy/src/lib”, no for startup, sl0 for 
security level, il3 for integrity level, username to “kandy”, group 
name to “stop”, yes for High Integrity, and leave the defaults for the 
rest of the settings. 
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1. Make sure the log files in the “/tmp” directory are deleted. 
2. Use sl to change the user’s security level to “min” security and 
“max” integrity. 
3. Run tp_edit to move the nfsd binary into a privileged directory so 
that it can be run in daemon mode.  Use “cd” to change the current 
working directory to “/system”.  Use “add” and set the program 
name to “nfsd”, the pathname to 
“/home/kandy/trans/nfs_bin/rpc.nfsd”, and leave the defaults for the 
rest of the settings.  
4. Run daemon_edit to configure how nfsd should be run.  Use “add” 
and set the name to “nfsd”, the commandline to “nfsd”, the 
argument to “-F”, the environment variable to 
“LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/home/kandy/src/lib”, no for startup, sl0 for 
security level, il3 for integrity level, username to “kandy”, group 
name to “stop”, yes for High Integrity, and leave the defaults for the 
rest of the settings. 
5. Run start_daemon and then type “nfsd” to start the nfsd daemon. 
 
C. SAMPLE EXPORTS FILE 
 
/usr/local        192.168.0.1(ro)     192.168.0.2(ro)     
/home             192.168.0.1(rw)     192.168.0.2(rw) 
Figure 6.   Example 'exports' File, From [LINU] 
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The first field is the name of the directory that will be shared.  The fields 
following that is a list of host that are allowed to use the shared directory along 
with the type of access allowed specified in parentheses.  'ro' will allow a host to 



















LIST OF REFERENCES 
[BARR] Barr, T., "Linux NFS-HOWTO," August 25, 2002, 
http://nfs.sourceforge.net/nfs-howto/index.html, March 15, 2004. 
 
[BELL73]  Bell, D., and LaPadula, L., "Secure Computer Systems: 
Mathematical Foundations and Model," MITRE Report, MTR 2547, 
Vol. 2, November 1973. 
 
[BIBA77]  Biba, K., "Integrity Considerations for Secure Computer Systems," 
ESD-TR-76-372, ESD/AFSC, Hanscom AFB, Bedford, MA, April 
1977. 
 
[COUL]  Coulouris, G., Dollimore, J., and Kindberg, T., "Distributed Systems: 
Concepts and Design," Third Edition, Addison-Wesley, 2001.  
 
 [FOC]  Focke, M., "XTS-400 Trusted Computer System Technical 
Overview," October 29, 2003,  
http://www.digitalnet.com/solutions/info_sec_sol/pdf/XTS-
400TechnicalOverview.pdf, January 13, 2004.  
 
[GEM] National Security Agency, National Computer Security Center, 
“Final Evaluation Report, Gemini Trusted Network Processor,” 
CSC-EPL-94/008, September 6, 1994, 
http://www.radium.ncsc.mil/tpep/epl/entries/CSC-EPL-94-008.html, 
January 10, 2004. 
 
[IRV04] Irvine, C. E., Levin, T. E., Nguyen T. D., Shifflett, D., Khosalim, J., 
Clark, P. C., Wong, A., Afinidad, F., Bibighaus, D., and Sears, J., 
"Overview of a High Assurance Architecture for Distributed 
Multilevel Security,” Submitted for publication, 2004. 
 
[MANU]  DigitalNet, "XTS-400 User’s Manual," XTDOC0005-02, Herndon, 
VA. January 2003. 
 
[MCKU]  McKusick, M., Bostic, K., Karels, M., and Quarterman, J., "The 
Design And Implementation of The 4.4 BSD Operating System," 
Addison-Wesley, 1996. 
 
[PEMB]  Pemberton, S., "The Ergonomics of Software Porting," February 24, 





[PERRINE]  Perrine, T.,  "The Kernelized Secure Operating System (KSOS)," 
login, Vol. 27, No. 6, December 2002, 
www.usenix.org/publications/login/ 2002-12/pdfs/perrine.pdf, 
February 15, 2004. 
 
[RED] Red Hat,  “Red Hat Support“, December 10, 2003, 
https://www.redhat.com/docs/manuals/linux/, January 27, 2004. 
 
[SAN85] Sandberg, R., Goldberg, D., Kleiman, S., Walsh, D., and Lyon, B. 
"The Design and Implementation of the Sun Network File System," 
In Proceedings Usenix Summer Conference, pages 119-130, June 
1985. 
 
[SALT75]  Saltzer, J. H.,  Schroeder, M. D., “The Protection of Information in 
Computer Systems,” Proceedings of the IEEE, 63(9):1278-1308, 
September 1975. 
 
[SCHELL74]  Karger, P., and Schell, R., "Multics Security Evaluation: 
Vulnerability Analysis," ESD-TR-74-193 Vol. II, ESD/AFSC, 
Hanscom AFB, Bedford, MA, June 1974. 
 
[SPEC89]  Sun Microsystems, "NFS: Network File System Protocol 
specification," RFC 1094, March 1989, 
http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc1094.html, February 2, 2004. 
 
[TP85]  DoD 5200.28 STD, Department of Defense Standard, “Department 
of Defense Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria,” 
December 1985. 
 
[WANG99]  Final Evaluation Report Wang XTS-300. April 27, 1999, 
http://www.radium.ncsc.mil/tpep/library/fers/CSC-EPL-92-003-
C.ps.gz, February 4, 2004. 
75 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1.   Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, VA  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  
 




4. RADM Joseph Burns 
Fort George Meade, MD 
 
5. Deborah Cooper 
DC Associates, LLC 
Roslyn, VA 
  
6. CDR Daniel L. Currie 
PMW 161 
San Diego, CA 
 




8. Richard Hale 
DISA 
Falls Church, VA 
 
9. LCDR Scott  D. Heller 
SPAWAR 
San Diego, CA 
 














13. Dr. Carl Landwehr 
 National Science Foundation 
Arlington, VA 
 
14. Steve LaFountain 
 NSA 
Fort Meade, MD 
 




16. Ray A. Letteer 
Head, Information Assurance, HQMC C4 Directorate 
 Washington, DC 
 
17. Penny Lehtola 
NSA 
Fort Meade, MD 
 
18. Ernest Lucier 
Federal Aviation Administration 
Washington, DC 
 
19. CAPT Sheila McCoy 
Headquarters U.S. Navy 
Arlington, VA 
  
20. Dr. Ernest McDuffie 
 National Science Foundation 
 Arlington, VA 
 
21. Dr. Vic Maconachy 
NSA 
Fort Meade, MD 
 
22. Doug Maughan 














25. Marshall Potter 
Federal Aviation Administration 
Washington, DC 
 
26. Dr. Roger R. Schell 
Aesec  
Pacific Grove, CA 
 
27. Keith Schwalm 
Good Harbor Consulting, LLC 
Washington, DC 
 








30. Daniel Wolf 
 NSA 
Fort Meade, MD 
 
31. CAPT Robert Zellmann 




32. Dr. Cynthia E. Irvine 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 
 
33. David Shifflett 





34. Kandy Phan 
SFS students:  Civilian, Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 
